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Abstract 
The paper aims to examine the role of institutions relative to economic policy and geography 
in explaining the differential level of development across countries over time. To that end, it 
attempts to construct a Development Quality Index (DQI) and an Institutional Quality Index 
(IQI)  by  using  multivariate  statistical  method  of  principal  components.  It  shows  that  (i) 
higher level of IQI along with economic policy and geography factors lead to a positive 
improvement in the level of DQI; and (ii) results remain robust for IQI and relatively robust 
for economic policy and geography even when it is compared across cross-section and panel 
data estimation for a set of 102 countries over 1980 to 2004. The results strongly indicate that 
institutions matter in the context of specific economic policy mixes and geography related 
factors illustrated by disease burden, etc. It demonstrates that relative influence of institutions 
varies across stages of development. 
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  An  increasing  number  of  developing  countries  are  gaining  transition  in  economic 
growth  and  are  able  to  raise  level  of  human  and  social  development.  The  key  question 
however, even when the process seems to work well, is how to hasten and sustain the speed 
of economic growth, and turn such growth into high quality sustainable development.  
  North advocated the new institutional economists (NIEs) to claim that institutions are 
a primary cause of economic development and that development agenda should be redirected 
to "build" institutions as that of the standards of developed countries of today.
2 In the words 
of  North  (1990):  “That  institutions  affect  the  performance  of  economies  is  hardly 
controversial. That the differential performance of economies over time is fundamentally 
influenced by the way institutions evolve is also not controversial.” The new institutional 
economists believe that stages of economic development are exogenously determined, or at 
best they influence development through institutions, by economic policy and geography.  
This paper attempts to understand the process of development in the context of three 
major  determinants  as  expounded  in  the  literature,  viz.,  institutions,  economic  policy 
measures and geography.  
The  NIEs  argue,  following  North’s  arguments  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson 
(2001) provided some of the influential empirical evidence to describe the importance of 
institutions. To address the issue of endogeneity, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson used 
settlers  mortality  (an  instrument  for  institutions  to  control  for  endogeneity  in  2SLS-IV 
regression  specification)  by  using  the  dataset  of  European  colonialists  mortality  rates  of 
soldiers, bishops and sailors, and concluded that Europeans adopted better institutions where 
they faced low mortality rates, and vice versa. The empirical evidence showed that after 
controlling  for  the  effects  of  institutions,  the  geography  did  not  matter  for  economic 
performance. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002, 2004) concluded that “Institutions as 
the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth” (2004).
3 Their findings were strengthened by 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), as they argued that “Institutions Rule: The primacy 
                                                 
1 See Basu (2008) for the larger version of this paper in the UNCTAD working paper series.  
2 Douglas North received Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1993 “for having renewed research in economic 
history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional 
change.”  




of institutions over geography and integration in economic development” They further noted 
that the “quality of institutions "trumps" everything else.” 
4  
Easterly  and  Levine  (2003)  demonstrated  that  institutions  can  explain  only  cross-
country variation in GDP per capita and concluded that “institutional quality seems to be a 
sufficient statistic for account for economic development.” Similarly, Hall and Jones (1999) 
attributed  the  differences  in  “output  per  worker”  due  to  differences  in  “institutions  and 
government policies.” To join this debate, Bardhan (2005) argued that perhaps institutions 
play an important role in determining economic performance, but a question still remains—
“Institutions matter, but which ones?” He proposed to look into two measures of institutional 
quality, namely, rule of law and weak political rights to regress not only on GDP per capita, 
but  also  on  literacy  and  life  expectancy.
5  He  found  that  rule  of  law  was  significant  in 
explaining the GDP per capita, but not the level of literacy as opposed to weak political 
rights variable. This perhaps indicates the importance of other sets of institutional quality 
variables rather than concentrating on property rights based measures of institutional quality 
alone for the explanation of development. 
6  
In some of the most cited papers in recent years on the relationship between trade 
policy, per se, and economic growth are probably that of Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards 
(1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2001, 2003) and Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003). The cross-country regression primarily suggests that countries that have opened up 
and  taken  robust  trade  policies  are  the  ones  growing  faster  than  the  others  in  raising 
economic performance. On contrary, there is still plenty of scepticism about the positive 
relationship between opening up and economic performance.
7 Stiglitz (1999), Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2000) and Muqtada (2003) raised questions about some of the above studies on 
economic  growth  and  openness.  Moreover,  another  concern  now  is  about  the  quality  of 
growth, rather than quantity per se.
8 In this context the role of social policies and better 
                                                 
4 The indicator is taken Political Risk Service (PRS)-Group’s International Country Risk Guide database. 
5 Two institutional indicators are taken from Kaufmann et al (2005) and Human Development Report of UNDP 
respectively.  
6 See Basu (2002; 2003a,b; and 2006) for further discussion and empirical evidence on the role of institutions to 
improve development within the background of economic policies and geography both at the national (India) 
and cross-country level.  
7 See Mussa (2000), Rodriguez (2006) for further discussion on economic integration, openness and growth 
relations.   




institutional framework is getting at the centre stage of the development policies across the 
countries. The economic policy includes the trade-policy changes, effective industrial policy 
measures and appropriate macroeconomic policies and are considered the centrepiece of the 
so-called Washington Consensus for ‘getting prices right’.
9 On the contrary, Easterly and 
Levine (2003) showed a completely “no effects of policy” on development once they were 
controlled for institutions. Hence, the policy matters view in development has not got clean 
chit either.
10 
How much does geography contribute to the explanation of the differences in cross-
country  economic  performance?  A  long  time  ago,  Montesquieu  (1748)  initiated  the 
discussions of geography view, by introducing climate theory to explain a lack of economic 
development. Diamond (1997) in “Guns, Germs and Steel”, stressed that geography explains 
the  dominance  of  Western  Europe  in  modern  times.  He  argued  for  the  importance  of 
geography and ecology to develop key institutions.  
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1998) professed that one could show a critical role of 
geography in affecting economic performance after controlling for macro economic policies 
and institutions. McArthur and Sachs (2001) argued against the primary role of institutions, 
as “both institutions and geographically-related variables such as malaria incidence or life 
expectancy at birth are strongly linked to gross national product per capita.”  
Bloom and Sachs (1998) claimed that Africa’s tropical environment could be seen as 
an  obstacle  to  economic  development.  They  also  underlined  that  fact  of  high  malaria 
incidence for their huge amount of reduction in annual economic growth rates. To assert 
more importance to malaria incidence and its devastating effect on human life, Gallup and 
Sachs (2001), and Sachs (2003a) put forward empirical evidence that it is not only economic 
development as measured by GDP per capita; also poverty is “intimately connected”. 
11  
Masters  and  McMillan  (2001)  provided  further  empirical  evidence  to  assert  that 
climatic conditions could determine economic performance. Taking the argument further and 
deeper,  Hibbs  and  Olsson  (2005,  2004)  described  the  key  role  of  geographic  and  initial 
biogeographic conditions to help transition from agriculture to industrial development. Their 
                                                 
9 This phrase has become synonymous to globalization. Williamson (2002) says: “Audiences the world over 
seem to believe that this signifies a set of neoliberal policies that have been imposed on hapless countries by the 
Washington-based international financial institutions and have led them to crisis and misery.” 
10 The “one-size-fits-all” recommendations of BWI’s were discredited by many.  




cross-country results show that effects of geography and biogeography strongly explain the 
current level of economic development differentials even after controlling for institutions as 
measured  by  social  infrastructure  in  Hall  and  Jones  (1999).  Sachs  (2003a)  declared  that 
“Institutions Don't Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income.”
12 All of these 
results  and  arguments  are  directed  to  showcase  that  geography  matters  for  economic 
development, even when controlled for institutional quality and economic policies.
13 
So, the literature unambiguously shows how economic research in this area has been 
debating on the question of primacy role of factors in explaining the underlying forces of 
economic performance variations. The existing studies tend to contradict to announce the 
winner  among  so-called  three  prime  contestants.  We  attempt  to  provide  a  conceptual 
framework  for  analysing  these  linkages  in  the  broader  context  of  development  and 
institutional quality.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the interrelationships among 
institutions,  economic  policy  and  geography.  Section  3  describes  the  methodology  to 
measure DQI and IQI. The cross-section and panel data, including system-GMM, results 
along with the relevant discussions for the econometric model specifications are reported in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Conceptual framework  
The paper attempts to go beyond simple GDP per capita measure to account for the 
quality of life aspect of development, and also provides a broader measure of the explanatory 
variable, such as the institutional quality index.
 14  
We propose to construct a new measure of development quality to account for the 
different dimensions of economic, health and knowledge of a country. This measure expands 
the dimension of the human development index, as DQI is supposed to provide, even, a 
broader-measure of development across countries. This intends to underscore the need to go 
beyond GDP per capita and/or HDI as a measure of development. 
                                                 
12 Sachs (2003b) reminded that “Institutions matters, but not for everything.” 
13  Baldwin  et  al  (2001)  show  how  geography  of  growth  takes-off  in  the  backdrop  of  “Global  Income 
Divergence, Trade, and Industrialization”.  




One of the seminal works in quantifying development in a broader perspective was by 
Adelman and Morris (1967). They aimed to examine the interactions among the processes of 
social, economic and political change with the level and pace of development. Morris D. 
Morris  (1979)  constructed  the  Physical  Quality  of  Life  Index  (PQLI)  to  measure  the 
development quality and/or quality of life with some social indicators. Dasgupta and Weale 
(1992) in measuring quality of life advanced the concept with the inclusion of civil and 
political  rights.  And  then  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)’s  Human 
Development Index (HDI, 1990-2005) had brought together the production and distribution 
of commodities and the expansion and use of human capabilities in their measure.
15  
The proposed Development Quality Index (DQI) is constructed on the basis of three 
dimensions:  economic,  health,  and  knowledge.  These  three  dimensions  are  supposed  to 
evaluate the society’s overall development level and quality of life. There are six indicators 
to measure the economic development of the people in the country: GDP per capita (in PPP 
international 2000 $), Telephone lines, Television sets, Radios, Electric power consumption 
per capita, and Energy use per capita. Over the years, there seems to be a consensus that 
these indicators are key to economic success of countries.  
In the health development quality dimension, we intend to identify the status of health 
in countries. We have selected five indicators to measure this dimension of the development 
quality index. The indicators are the following: Life expectancy at birth, Infant mortality rate, 
Physicians, Immunization of children, and CO2 emissions per capita. The CO2 indicator 
shows an environmental aspect, which may lead to degradation of health conditions. 
16 
Finally, in the knowledge development dimension, four indicators are included. These 
indicators provide both the quantity and quality aspects of knowledge and/or human capital 
accumulation. The indicators are the following: adult literacy rate, primary school enrolment 
rate, secondary school enrolment rate and total number of years in schools.
17 The idea here is 
to capture not only total literacy conditions, but also to see their components. Finally, we 
                                                 
15  See  Anand  and  Sen  (1994)  on  “Human  development  Index:  Methodology  and  Measurement”  for  a 
comprehensive discussion of HDI, Sen (1999) for detailed discussion on development as freedom concept and 
related paradigm, and Sengupta(2000) on rights-based approach to development. 
16  The  concept  of  Green  Growth  is  now  taking  shape  around  the  world  to  account  for  the  environmental 
concerns.  
17 The Barro and Lee (2000) dataset shows the average years of schooling in the adult population (25 years of 




have  selected  15  indicators  to  measure  a  composite  index  of  development  quality  index 
(DQI). 
18  
Moreover, we conceptualize the institutional quality into three dimensions to organize 
provide a new measure of institutional quality. The indicators are obtained from existing 
sources, but we use a new methodology to prepare a composite index by assigning statistical  
weights to these chosen indicators and grouped into three categories. 
19 Therefore, the new 
measure  of  aggregated  Institutional  Quality  Index  (IQI)  is  constructed  to  monitor  and 
evaluate  the  quality  of  institutions  among  countries.  Our  institutional  quality  measure  is 
based on three dimensions: economic, social and political.  
There  are  now  some  widely  used  measure  of  institutional  quality  to  capture 
institutional dimensions around the world. Perhaps, “Governance Matters IV: Governance 
Indicators for 1996–2004” as constructed by Kaufmann at al. (2005) of the World Bank, has 
now  become  the  standard  tool  to  measure  institutional  quality  around  the  world.  The 
governance indices are compiled from different sources and are put together. Some of the 
sources  that  go  into  constructing  that  index  are  the  following:  PRS  Group-ICRG  index, 
Freedom House’s Economic Freedom Index, POLCON database, Polity IV project database 
and many others.  
The dimension, economic institutional quality, is composed of eight indicators: legal 
and property rights (on an increasing scale of 1-10), bureaucratic quality (on a scale of 0-4 
scale, 4 corresponding to the lowest level of bureaucracy), corruption (on a scale of 0-6, 6 
corresponding  to  least  corruption),  democratic  accountability  (on  a  scale  of  0-6  scale,  6 
corresponding to the highest level of accountability), government stability  (on an increasing 
scale of 0-12), law and order (on an increasing scale of 0-6), independent judiciary (on a 
binary scale of 0-1, 1 corresponding to greater independence), and regulation (on a scale of 
1-10 scale, 10 corresponding to the lowest level of regulation).
  
The  dimension,  social  institutional  quality,  is  intended  to  represent  rights  and 
empowerment through the following indicators: press freedom (on an increasing scale of 1-
3), civil liberties (on an increasing scale of 1-10), physical integrity (on a scale of 0-8, 8 
                                                 
18 All the indicators that make up the DQI are self-explanatory in nature.  
19  See  UNDPs  publication  “Sources  for  Democratic  Governance  Indicators”  for  the  most  comprehensive 





corresponding to the highest level), empowerment rights (on an increasing scale of 0-10), 
freedom  of  association  (on  an  increasing  scale  of  0-2),  women's  political  rights  (on  an 
increasing  scale  of  0-3),  women’s  economic  right  (on  an  increasing  scale  of  0-3),  and 
women's social rights (on an increasing scale of 0-3).
20  
The  dimension,  political  institutional  quality,  includes  the  following  indicators: 
executive constraint (on a scale of 1-7 scale, 7 corresponding to the level of least constraint), 
democracy (on an increasing scale of 0-70), political rights (on an increasing scale of 0-10), 
polity  (on  a  scale  of  0-10,  10  corresponding  to  the  highest  level  of  democracy),  lower 
legislative effectiveness (on a binary scale of 0-1, 1 corresponding to an effective lower level 
for  the  legislative  process),  upper  legislative  effectiveness  (on  a  binary  scale  of  0-1,  1 
corresponding  to  an  effective  upper  level  for  the  legislative  process),  and  sub-federal 
independence (on a binary scale of 0-1, 1 corresponding to a higher level of decentralisation). 
There are thus 23 indicators in total for the three dimensions of IQI. (See Appendix Table A1 
for list of indicators in DQI and IQI) 
Geography  is  measured  by  an  absolute  value  of  the  distance from  the  equator  in 
degrees, latitude, that is scaled between 0 and 1, where 0 is the equator), and other indicators 
such as climatic, ecological and incidence of malaria , while economic policy measures are 
captured by some of the key economic policy interventions such as macroeconomic stability 
policies to contain inflation; trade policies for removal of quantitative restrictions on imports, 
reduction in import tariffs to increase trade openness and integration to the world economy; 
other external sectors control policies to intervene in exchange rate determination; financial 
market  policies  for  banking  sectors,  capital  liberalization  measures,  credit  market 
deregulation mechanisms; and domestic industrial policies of privatisation of the key state 
owned enterprises, removal of state sponsored subsidies; and flexible labour market policies, 
etc.  So,  the  economic  policy  is  measured  by  trade  openness,  inflation,  exchange  rate 
differential, credit market deregulation and capital liberalization measures). (See Appendix 
Table A2) 
The issue of endogeneity is taken care of in this paper. In the case of institutions, the 
economic  policies  may  also  be  influenced  by  income  and  institutions.  Hence,  there  are 
possibilities  of  reverse  causality.  On  the  other  hand,  NIEs  argues  that  geography  is  an 
                                                 




exogenous determinant of economic performance. However, the proponents of a geography 
hypothesis  argue  that  geography  can  directly  affect  the  human  health and  environmental 
conditions, and that would in turn influence economic conditions.
 21 
As Sachs argues that the disease burden, as measured by malaria transmission and 
other  diseases  can  not  be  taken  exogenous  anymore,  as  they  are  invariably  affected  by 
development and institutional quality. Therefore, for empirical treatment, we need to find out 
“good instruments” to tackle the endogeneity concern of institutions, economic policy, and 
geography-related factors. In this paper, we am not introducing any new ‘instruments’. We 
make use of exiting instruments for institutions (European colonizer’s settler mortality and 
Europeans  ethnolinguistic  fractions  that  combined  English  language  speaking  population, 
and  other  European  language,  such  as  French,  German,  Spanish,  Portuguese,  speaking 
population  are two most widely used instruments now), economic policy (constructed trade 
share derived from a gravity-based approach of bilateral trade estimation), and geography 
(ecological and climatic conditions) for the 2SLS-IV (two stage least squares- instrumental 
variables) regression estimations to address endogeneity of the variables.  
  So, according to the above discussions, we need to test if, indeed, institutional quality 
is  the  only  significant  determinants  of  development.  The  proponents  of  economic  policy 
measures and geography argue a close interrelationship among these factors in determining 
differential of variation among countries. Therefore, the testable hypothesis is: 
  Institutional quality (measured by an index IQI) is a significant factor relative to 
economic policy and geography in explaining quality of development (measured by an index 
DQI), but its relative significance depends on a country's stage of development. 
Throughout  this  paper,  with  the  two  new  measures  of  development  (DQI)  and 
institutions (IQI), we intend to explore thoroughly the above hypothesis. Furthermore, the 
paper helps to disentangle the complexities of development process by introducing DQI, and 





                                                 
21  See  Chong  (2000)  and  Kaufman  and  Kraay  (2003)  on  the  causality  between  institutions  and  economic 
growth.  





3. Measuring Development and Institutions  
  In this section, we propose two new measures, Development Quality Index (DQI) and 
Institutional  Quality  Index  (IQI).  Nagar  and  Basu  (2002)  developed  a  methodology  to 
construct  a  composite  index  based  on  the  multivariate  statistical  technique  of  principal 
component analysis. 
23 The key advantage of this methodology is the possibility to define a 
composite measure that is able to account for interactions and interdependence between the 
identified set of dimensions and variables to construct the DQI and IQI. 
  3.1 Computational method of DQI and IQI  
  We postulate DQI and IQI are, in fact, a latent variable, which cannot be measured 
directly in a straightforward manner.  However, we assume that it is linearly determined by 
many exogenous variables say, K X X ,......., 1 .  
Let  e X X Y K K + + + + = b b a ......... 1 1 --------(1) 
where  K X X ,......., 1 , measured over countries is a set of total number of variables that are 
used to capture Y (DQI or IQI). For normalisation, the maximum and minimum values of 
these indicators are taken from world sample, so that we can trace out their relative rise over 
the period at the national level. In the case of regional level analysis, the maximum and 
minimum values are taken from countries own sample during the period under study.  
  Following normalization of exogenous variables, we construct principal components 
of K X X ,......., 1 , which have the property that the first principal component (P1) accounts for 
the  largest  proportion  of  total  variation  in  all  development  quality  variables,  the  second 
principal component (P2) accounts for the second largest proportion of total variation in all 
development quality variables, and so on. If we compute as many principal components as 
the number of development quality variables, the total variation in all of them is accounted 
for  by  all  principal  components  together.  It  is  worthwhile  to  note  that  the  principal 
components are mutually orthogonal.  It is worthwhile to note that the DQI and IQI are a 
weighted sum of a normalized version of these selected variables, where respective weights 
are obtained from the analysis of principal components. 
                                                 

















1 1 /  --------(2) 
  Here weights are the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix of exogenous normalised 
variables.  We  have  arranged  them  in  descending  order  of  magnitude  as 
K K P Var P Var l l = = , , 1 1 L . Moreover, we assign largest weight  ∑ i l l / 1  to P1 because 
it accounts for the largest proportion of total variation in all development quality variables.  
Similarly P2 has been assigned the second largest weight  ∑ i l l / 2  because it accounts for 
the  second  largest  proportion  of  the  total  variation  in  all  the  development  quality  and 
institutional quality variables, and so on.  
In  the  case  of  Development  Quality  Index  (DQI),  we  separately  compute  three 
dimensions of development quality: economic, health and knowledge, in line with above 
methodology. Once, we obtain three indices, we then again run the model to construct the 
DQI for each of the countries in the sample for the specific time point, say, t. Similarly, we 
construct three separate dimensions of IQI: economic, social and political, and then combine 
them again with the similar procedure to obtain index of institutional quality. The higher 
values  of  both  indices  indicate  higher  level  of  development  and  institutional  quality 
respectively and the indices are comparable over time.
24  
   
4. The empirical model 
  The hypothesis is examined through the framework of the following basic equation: 
i i i i i GEOG EPOL IQI DQI e a a a a + + + + = 4 3 2 1      (3) 
where the dependent variable DQIi is development quality index in country i of the current 
sample; and three ‘primary’ explanatory variables are the following: IQIi is the Institutional 
Quality Index; EPOLi is the trade/GDP ratio, an indicator of economic openness and attempts 
to  integrate  with  the  world  economy;  GEOGi  is  a  measure  of  geography,  which  is  the 
                                                 
24 See Basu and Nagar (2004) for the statistical properties of this type of composite index as estimator of a 




absolute distance from the equator;  i e is a random error term; and the subscript i denotes 
country i. 
    Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of (3) were made with the use of combined 
time-series and cross-section data for the  non-overlapping periods, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 
1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004. 
  If  it  is  assumed  that  IQIi  and  EPOLi  are  endogenous  variables,  there  is  reverse 
causation, which vitiates the assumption of the independence of these two indicators and the 
random error term, thus making the parameters in (3) estimated through OLS difficult to 
interpret. In technical terms the estimates of the parameters are biased, and the error will not 
disappear as the sample of observations increases, i.e. the estimates are also inconsistent.  
This  problem  is  handled  here  through  the  method  of  two-stage  least  squares  with 
instrumental  variables  (2SLS-IV).    For  this  purpose,  following  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and 
Robinson (2001), logSMi, a measure of settler mortality, and following Frankel and Romer 
(1999),  EPOLCi,  an  appropriately  constructed  trade  share,  are  included  as  instruments 
assumed to contribute together with the exogenous variable, GEOGi, to the determination of 
IQIi  and EPOLi.  We also employ other instruments of institutions to test the robustness of 
the result. Thus in the first-stage of the 2SLS-IV OLS estimates of IQIi and EPOLi are made 
on the basis of the following two equations:  
i
i
EPOL i i i i
IQI i i i i
GEOG SM EPOLC EPOL
GEOG EPOLC SM IQI
e q q q q
e b b b b
+ + + + + =
+ + + + =
4 3 2 1
4 3 2 1
log
log
      (4) 
The resulting OLS estimates of IQIi, β1 + β2 logSMi + β3 EPOLCi  + β4GEOGi. and of 
EPOLi, θ1 + θ2EPOLCi + θ3 logSMi + θ4 GEOGi, are then inserted in equation (1), removing 
the problem of the dependence of IQIi and EPOLi on εi, the error term.  
  The results of the estimates for the two stages of 2SLS-IV carried out on pooled 
cross-section data for 1980-2004 are shown separately for three groups: all countries in the 
sample, after exclusion of countries belonging to EU10 and SEE&CIS, and after exclusion of 
African countries.  
  As an alternative approach to addressing problems posed by the pooling of cross-




techniques of modelling panel data can be employed. These techniques make possible the 
identification of changes through time in the way in which IQI and the other regressors 
influence DQI. They also have the advantage of allowing for the effects on estimation of 
such  issues  as  unobserved  country  effects,  biases  due  to  omitted  variables  leading  to 
unobserved  heterogeneity,  outliers,  endogeneity,  etc.  and  of  producing  more  reliable 
estimates as the sample of observations and the number of degrees of freedom increase. 
25  
  The basic specification of the equation used for the estimation with panel data is as 
follows: 
it it it i it EPOL IQI DQI e b b a + + + = 2 1        (5) 
where DQIit is development quality index in country i (for i= 1, 2,….102) at time t (for 
t=1980-84,….2000-2004) of the current sample,  i a is an unobserved time- invariant country-
specific heterogeneity term, IQIit is the Institutional Quality Index; EPOLit is a measure of 
countries economic policy, and  it e is a random error term. Country-specific effects which are 
covered by GEOG in the OLS and 2SLS-IV regressions are now included in αi. According to 
the  hypothesis  stated  above  that  the  signs  of  β1  and  β2  are  expected  to  be  positive  and 
significant.  
  If a simple pooled OLS-estimation procedure is applied to estimate equation (3), the 
model will not exploit all the panel structures, and the coefficient estimates will be inefficient 
and standard errors may be incorrect. The choice of approach to panel data depends on the 
assumptions made about αi the variable representing the unobserved heterogeneity in the 
data.  If  it  is  assumed  that  i a and  the  regressors  may  be  correlated,  then  the  appropriate 
estimation procedure is one of those for the fixed effects model (FEM). But if they can be 
assumed to be uncorrelated, the appropriate procedure is that for the random effects model 
(REM). Whether the FEM or the REM is preferred, the Hausman specification test can be 
used to check the statistical significance of the difference between parameters estimated on 
the basis of the two alternatives. 
  The framework of a dynamic model for panel data framework can also be used to 
investigate  variation  in  parameters  within  a  cross-section  and  through  time.  In  recent 
                                                 




empirical  literature  two  types  of  dynamic  panel  models  have  been  used:  the  difference-
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
(henceforth AB) and the system-GMM as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) (henceforth 
BB).  In  GMM  specifications  the  estimator  allows  for  the  inclusion  of  lagged  dependent 
variables among the explanatory variables, which takes care of unobserved country- specific 
heterogeneity and the endogeneity of other explanatory variables by introducing appropriate 
lagged variables to be used as instruments.  
  Following Arellano and Bond (1991), equation 5 can be re-specified as follows:  
it it it t i it EPOL IQI DQI DQI e b b g D + D + D + D = D - 2 1 1 ,        (6) 
where  Dis  the  first  difference  operator.  Since  the  new  error  term  it e D is  by  assumption 
correlated with the lagged dependent variable 1 , - D t i DQI , AB used the following instrumental 
variables: levels of DQI lagged two and more periods, and levels of the IQI and EPOL 
lagged two and more periods. It is intuitively difficult to account for the differences in IQI 
and  EPOL  on  differences  in  DQI.  But  BB  showed  that  when  explanatory  variables  are 
persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regression 
equations expressed in first differences. Thus BB is able to combine the first-differentiated 
GMM  with  the  regressions  in  levels  (system-GMM).  This  method  reduces  the  potential 
biases  associated  with  the  estimators  of  the  first  difference-GMM  of  AB  and  produces 
consistent  and  efficient  parameter  estimates.
26  The  analysis  is  only  carried  out  by  using 
system-GMM only for dynamic panel models.  
  The results of their analysis, which regresses DQI on lagged DQI, IQI, political IQI, 
social IQI, economic IQI, EPOL which also includes now inflation, the differential between 
the  official  and  black-market  exchange  rates,  and  measure  of  credit  and  capital-account 
liberalisation measure
27.   
                                                 
26 See Bond (2002) for an in depth analysis of dynamic panel models.   
27 The basic source of capital-account liberalization measures are taken from IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Rate Arrangements and Restrictions. This measure is created as follows: if a country is open in all the five years 
during the period, say 2000-2004, then assign score 1; if it is open for 4 years, assign score 0.8, for 3 years 0.6, 
and so on. 0 is assigned if country is closed in all the five years. So, the variable takes value from 0 (capital 
control-  not  capital-account  liberalization)  and  1  (no  capital  control-  highest  level  of  capital-account 




  This paper is based on 102 countries as shown in Table A3, with 22 OECD countries. 
The list also shows that of 29 least developed and small-medium size economies as defined 
by United Nations and WTO respectively. This also includes 64 countries from AJR (2001) 
sample on settler mortality data. We have computed DQI and IQI for 102 countries for five 
time points: 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004. In the cross-
section regression results, initially we obtained period wise OLS estimates. Then we make 
average of the five time points, to run the cross-country regressions. However, sample size 
differs due to (i) settler mortality rate data from AJR (2001) which has data on 64 countries, 
(ii)  the  whole  sample  (102  countries),  and  (iii)  country  groupings,  like  only  developing 
countries (76 countries), and least developed countries and small-economies (29 countries). 
  In panel data regression, we use a five-yearly dataset for each of the 102 countries in 
each  of  the  time  points.  This  indicates  a  balanced  panel  dataset,  with  a  total  of  510 
observations. Likewise in the cross-section case, the total numbers of observations vary in 
panel-data depending on the above classification of sample of countries. (See Table A4 and 
A5 for correlation between DQI, IQI and all exogenous indicators) 
 
5. Results 
This  section  discusses  results  both for  cross-section  and  panel  data  estimation, including 
dynamic  modelling.  In  section  5.1,  initially,  we  discuss  results  from  cross-section 
regressions;  including  OLS  and  two-stage  least  squares  instrumental  (2SLS-IV)  results. 
Robustness analysis is also reported.
  28 In section 5.2, we discuss results from panel data 
analysis, both in static and dynamic framework. In a dynamic panel, we provide results for 
System-General  Methods  of  Moments  (System-GMM)  of  Blundell-Bond  (1998)  two-step 
procedure.  
  In Table A6, we present the results of this basic specification for each of the time 
points of the sample. In column 1 of panel 1, the results are shown for the period 1980-84, 
and in the last column we show the results after averaging the whole period, from 1980 to 
2004. The OLS results clearly indicate that for the whole sample of 102 countries, in each of 
                                                 
28 See Nagar (1959) for seminal work on 2SLS analysis. Nagar and Gupta (1970) for further discussion in a 




the periods, the coefficient of IQI remains significant at the 1%-level.
29 The coefficient of the 
geography variable is positive and significant at the 1%-level for all periods, and the whole 
period as well. The coefficient of the economic policy variable is positive but significant at 
10%  level.  This  goes  with  our  hypothesis  that  IQI;  policy  and  geography  variables  are 
positively correlated with DQI variable. In  next  three  panels,  we  replicate  the  same 
specifications,  but  with  three  different  dimensions  of  IQI,  namely,  political,  social  and 
economic. It is noteworthy that in all the period specifications, and for the whole period the 
results show a positive and significant sign for IQI dimensions. 
  Let us illustrate the case of India and Switzerland for a probable impact of IQI on 
DQI. If OLS is a causal relationship, then the size of the coefficient on IQI suggests its 
impact on DQI. For example, India has an IQI value in the sample of 7.34, and a DQI of 
5.90.  The  regression  coefficient  from  column  1  of  Table  A6  (with  geography  and  the 
economic policy variable as explanatory variables) indicates that if India had an IQI closer to 
the IQI of 12.22 in Switzerland, then India would raise its level of DQI to about 16.88 (as 
against  DQI  of  5.90  in  the  sample,  and  of  35.55  of  Switzerland),  which  indicates  an 
improvement of over 186% from its current DQI value.  
  Coming  to  the  coefficients  of  two  other  indicators,  in  these  three  different  IQI 
dimensions, we provide evidence that although the geography variable continues to remain 
positive and statistically significant; however, the economic policy variable (as measured by 
trade/GDP ratio) is insignificant at the conventional confidence level in social and economic 
dimensions of IQI model specifications. We are not stretching far here the implications of 
this result, but one may tend to think that “stable” political institutions and/or good political 
institutions  (of  course,  democracy  is  part  of  the  process  and  inside  the  political  IQI 
dimension) can provide better environments to carry out “good” economic policies and/or 
encourage deeper integration of its own economy to the rest of the world, for trade to foster 
economic performance subsequently.
30 
                                                 
29 Throughout this paper, we report robust standard errors and adjusted for clustering by country.  
30 See Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) for not only discussion of positive relationship between economic reforms 





  However, the OLS regressions results should not taken as causal or precise, as the 
coefficients  are  biased,  and  there  is  some  reverse  causality,  omitted  variable  bias, 
measurements errors are persistent. Also there are the missing effects of country differences.  
  5.1b 2SLS-IV regressions: IQI and EPOL as endogenous variables  
  We report 2SLS-IV results where Panel A shows second-stage results of the equation 
(3) in which IQI and EPOL are the fitted value from the first stage regressions as in Panel B 
of estimated equation (2) as shown in Table A7.  In panel A, column 1 shows the second-
stage  regressions  results  of  the  impact  of  IQI,  geography  and  economic  policy  on 
development quality. The impact of IQI on DQI is now 3.57, and statistically significant at 
1%-level.  This coefficient value is larger than OLS estimates.  This indicates that there is 
attenuation bias from “measurement error” in the IQI variable. However, contrary to the 
finding of “wrong sign” of the geography variable, both in AJR (2001) and RST (2004), the 
estimates show that the geography variable has “right sign” but is insignificant. This may 
indicate that for development quality, going beyond the simple measure of GDP per capita, 
geography may have a positive impact.
31 We intend to show further results to discuss this 
later. Furthermore, the economic policy variable is also insignificant in the first specification, 
but it has “right sign” as we expected. In panel A, in the next column, we excluded from the 
sample Neo-Europe countries (Australia, New Zealand, Canada and USA). The result on IQI 
does not change much, but the EPOL is now significant at the 10%-level. The geography 
variable shows again positive sign in this specification.  This indicates the robustness of our 
specification and importance of three variables. In the next column, we excluded Africa from 
the sample, and find that IQI coefficient is 3.20, and so are the sign and significance of 
geography and the economic policy variable. The fourth column excludes both neo-Europe 
and Africa from the sample. Now the coefficient on IQI rises to 3.27 and geography and 
policy variables are also highly significant in this sample.   
  We present results from the first-stage regressions in Panel B. Instruments have the 
expected sign for the endogenous variables. For example, in the case of ex-colony sample, 
settler mortality has a negative and statistically significant effect on IQI, so is the constructed 
trade share on the EPOL variable. The coefficient of geography is positive and statistically 
                                                 




significant  in  the  IQI  endogenous  variable.  This  is  consistent  with  the  findings  of  AJR 
(2001), and RST (2004). Two other specifications are almost similar. It indicates that the 
instruments chosen for IQI and EPOL are valid and sensible. 
  The Table also reports key diagnostic tests of 2SLS-IV regression estimates both for 
Panel  A  and  B.  In  this  model  estimation,  there  are  two  endogenous  variables  and  two 
instruments;  hence,  it  is  a  case  of  exact  identification.  However,  over-identification  is  a 
desirable property because it increases the efficiency of the estimates and allows for over-
identifying restrictions tests (Sargen-Hansen J test). Later in the analysis of further results, 
we  include  more  instruments  than  endogenous  variables,  and  show  the  over-identifying 
restrictions tests. We also provide statistics on weak instruments. The F-statistics for first-
stage regressions for IQI and EPOL show (in ex-colony) are about 10 as suggested by Staiger 
and Stock (1997).
32  However, in the case of specification without Africa, and without neo-
Europe and Africa in the sample, instrument for EPOL and IQI show statistic values well 
below threshold values that may raise some degree of concern over their validity in this 
particular  group  of  country  specifications.  However,  settler  mortality  seems  to  be  an 
appropriate instrument for IQI in all the model specifications. Next, we report a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman  test  for  endogeneity  of  IQI  and  EPOL.  The  null  of  exogeneity  is  rejected 
overwhelmingly in all the specifications at the 1%-level indicating that they are, indeed, 
endogenous  variables.  For  the  Heteroskedasticity  test,  we  report  Breusch-
Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg  tests  in  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity  in  an  OLS 
regression,  under  the  null  of  no  heteroskedasticity.  The  results  show  that  in  first  two 
specifications,  the  null  is  rejected  at  1%  and  10%-levels,  but  not  in  the  last  two 
specifications. Then we report in Panel B, Shea (1997) diagnostic tests for determining the 
strength  of  the  instruments  in  the  case  of  multiple  endogenous  variables,  and  take  into 
account inter-correlations among instruments. The Shea R2 is relatively higher in all the 
specifications, and is relatively higher in the last two sample specifications. 
33 
  So,  the  overall  results  in  Table  A7  indicate  that  although  IQI  is  influential  in 
explanation of the variations in DQI, the importance of geography and economic policy are 
                                                 
32 The rule of thumb is that for a single endogenous variable, the F-statistics should be at least 10 to satisfy 
strength for the instrument..  




still well intact. This paper attempts to unlock their inter-linkages by introducing different 
instruments, sample groups, and panel data estimation.  
  We make use of larger sample of countries, in line with the argument presented by 
Hall and Jones (1999), where instruments for IQI are the following: fraction of population 
speaking other European language (eurfrac), and fraction of population speaking English 
(engfrac). We also report results for three dimensions of IQI in Table A8. In column 1, we 
report the coefficient of IQI, GEOG and EPOL on DQI. The IQI is significant and positive. 
The coefficient of IQI is smaller though in this large sample compared to table A7 results. 
Once again, we find that the geography variable is positive and significant, and so as the 
economic policy variable.  
  In the next three columns, we estimate three IQI dimensions on DQI along with the 
GEOG  and  EPOL  variables.  In  all  these  specifications,  we  find  that  the  economic  IQI 
variable  in  column  4  has  the  largest  coefficient  compared  to  political  and  social  IQI 
dimensions. We also find that geography and the economic policy variable are positive and 
significant. Hence, these results again go against the results of AJR (2001) and RST (2004). 
Perhaps, it indicates to the fact that policy matters and geography matters for overall level of 
development quality, which may not necessarily be a case in the current level of GDP per 
capita.  
  Moreover, all the diagnostics tests for weak instruments, and the Sargen-Hansen J test 
for over-identifying restrictions pass the test, as the p value is always higher than 0.05, which 
means that the instruments are valid, exogenous and do not belong in the set of explanatory 
variables in this specification. This is really assuring for the strength of instruments.
34 In 
first-stage regressions, the F-test value is greater that 10 suggesting that the instruments are 
well  correlated  with  the  endogenous  variable  in  all  the  model  specifications.  Hence,  the 
diagnostics tests seem to work well for all three dimensions of IQI as well.   
  We  present  robustness  checks  of  our  analysis  by  using  both  the  settler  mortality 
sample of ex-colonies without neo-Europe countries and two instruments of Hall and Jones 
(1999) in line with specifications in table A8. In Table A9 of column 1, we add regional 
                                                 
34 The use of these instruments should not be interpreted as though these countries were in need again of going 




dummies with basic specification. The coefficient of IQI is highly positive and significant as 
in column 2 of table 9 and also the size is larger in this specification. The coefficients of 
geography  and  economic  policy  are  positive  and  are  insignificant  at  10%-level.  But  the 
regional dummies are not statistically significant either. We use Hadi (1992) procedure to 
detect outliers in the estimation, and dropped the outlier countries from the sample, and re-
estimated the model.
35 
  In the next four specifications, we include French legal origin dummy, followed by 
religion, language  and  ethnic fractionalization  variables.   Alesina  et al (2003)  introduces 
these three fractionalization variables, and we make use of this in our specifications. The 
religion variable is negative but is not statistically significant, while the language variable is 
significant and positive; and the ethnic variable is insignificant, in this ex-colony sample. The 
whole  sample  make  use  of  Hall and  Jones  (1999)  instruments,  we find  that  the  religion 
coefficient  and  language  coefficient  are  positive,  and  ethnic  is  negative.  In  their  paper 
Alesina et al (2003) noted that the religion coefficient does not follow any pattern when it is 
used to explain GDP growth, but language and ethnic coefficients are negative. However, we 
tend to believe that heterogeneity of linguistic and ethnic fractionalization may work well 
under a democratic setting that would eventually spur economic development.
36 Otherwise, 
IQI coefficients remain highly significant across all the different specifications with inclusion 
of additional variables.   
  Then, we include additional geography variables, as has been used in the literature, to 
test the robustness of results in Table A10) The objective here is to cross check to all if 
geography, as an exogenous variable −like climatic condition, proximity to market, etc, plays 
a role in influencing development quality other than through institutional quality. We run 
these model specifications by using Hall and Jones (1999) instruments for the whole sample 
of  102  countries.
37  In  all  the  specifications  of  Table  A10,  I  drop  two  influential  outlier 
countries,  namely,  Japan  and  Singapore,  from  the  sample  by  using  the  Hadi  (1992) 
                                                 
35 We note the outlier countries in the tables.  
36 In Basu, Fan and Zhang (2006), we argue that in a democratic society like India, the development strategies 
tend to grow in a balanced manner because of different interest groups and fractionalization, while it is not the 
case in a society like China, which is highly homogeneous (0-1 scale with 1 highest fractionalization. The figure 
is 0.15 for China and 0.42 in India).  
37 Because of some missing variables of geography related variables for the set of countries in our sample, the 





38  Column  1  reports  the  basic  specification  with  ‘landlocked’  dummy,  which 
enters in the second-stage regressions with negative sign but is insignificant. Then we add a 
‘tropical’ variable, the percentage of a country’s land area in the tropics, and it enters with a 
negative sign but insignificant, as well. Following Masters and McMillan (2001), we use two 
key  climatic  variables:  area  under  frost  and  days  under  frost.  They  argue  that  tropical 
countries face a disadvantage because of the absence of winter frost, and we show that their 
argument is worth noting. Both variables enter with positive coefficients and later one is 
significant at the 1%-level. This result contradicts the one found by Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2004) to explain the GDP per capita only. Then by adding mean temperature of a 
country, and, as expected, it has a negative sign but insignificantly enters into the equation. 
Following, Sachs (2003), we add a variable to measure the share of a country’s population in 
temperate  ecozones.  To  estimate  the  impact  of  country’s  proximity  to  sea,  we  enter, 
following Sachs (2003) in the equation, the proportion of land area within 100 km of area of 
the seacoast. It turns out to be positive in the second-stage regressions. Finally, after adding 
the endowment of hydrocarbons per capita, the findings show results similar to those of 
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger  (1998), that of positive and significant effects on development 
quality. In all these cases, the results indicate expected signs of the variables, which simply 
imply  that  climatic  conditions  matter,  in  some  varying  degree  though,  for  development 
quality. This table points that IQI, the original geography variable, and the economic policy 
variables remain significant in all the different model specifications, and by adding other 
geographical and climatic condition variables actually do matter in explaining the differences 
in  development  quality,  as  was  rejected  in  earlier  studies  of  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and 
Robinson (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi  (2004).  
  5.1c 2SLS-IV regressions: IQI, EPOL and Geography as endogenous variables  
  In this section, we argue following Sachs that disease burden, as measured by risk of 
malaria  transmission;  is  a  key  geography  related  factor  that  matters  for  variations  in 
development  quality.  McArthur  and  Sachs  (2001)  noted  “both  institutions  and 
geographically-related variables (such as malaria incidence or other health indicators) play a 
role in determining GNP per capita.” In this spirit, we show, indeed, geography related-
                                                 




malaria incidence-affects development quality even after controlling for institutional quality 
and economic policy variables. There are two malaria-incidence related variables: (i) mal94p 
is the proportion of each country’s population that live with risk of malaria transmission 
based on 1994 WHO world map of a malaria risk database; and (ii) malfal is the proportion 
of population that live with risk of transmission of the fatal species, plasmodium falciparum. 
Then  to  control  for  a  reverse  causality  from  DQI  to  disease  burden,  we  use  the  set  of 
instruments as proposed by McArthur and Sachs (2001). 
39 
  In Table A11 and Table A12, we show the results for the Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) sample with settler mortality as an instrument for IQI and for the whole 
sample with Hall and Jones  (1999) instruments of IQI. Furthermore, we also present three 
dimensions of IQI, along with an economic policy measure and malaria incidence variables. 
Column 1 of Table A11 shows that IQI is positive and significant, while economic policy and 
malaria variables have ‘right signs’ but are insignificant. Now, in the case of a political IQI 
variable, the malaria incidence variable is negative and significant; and the economic policy 
measure is significant at the 10%-level. The result holds in social and economic dimensions 
of IQI as well for the malaria variable (for malfal variable too), but the economic policy 
variable is insignificant. I find same pattern of signs and significance level with the whole 
sample. We also report at the bottom of the table the entire set of diagnostic tests and they 
pass all the conventional tests. (Appendix Table A12). 
  To do further robustness checks of these results, we subdivided the countries into two 
groups, developing countries, and least developed and small-medium size economies. We 
include here only two malaria related variables after controlling for IQI and its dimensions.
40 
The results clearly indicate here that malaria risk matters for development quality, as in the 
IQI as argued by Sachs and others.
41 (Appendix Table A13)   
 
 
                                                 
39 Sachs (2003) used malaria ecology (me), ecology-based variable that could be predictive of malaria risk, as 
an instrument for malaria risk.  
40 In Sachs’ specifications, he looked only at the malaria along with an institutional variable. I drop South Korea 
in all these specifications by using Hadi (1992) procedure.  
41 It may be noted that the size of coefficients of IQI’s decline once I divide countries in sub-sample in line with 




  5.1d 2SLS-IV regressions: IQI, ‘other’ EPOL and Geography as endogenous variables  
  In Section 2.3, we introduced the discussions on the role of economic policy and its 
impact  on  development  quality.  In  sub-sections  4.1a  to  4.1c,  the  trade/GDP  ratio  was 
considered as a measure of overall economic policy (EPOL) of a country. The significance of 
coefficient  of  EPOL  (expected  to  be  positive)  differs  across  different  specifications  and 
country groupings. In this section, we introduce some other economic policy variables, such 
as macroeconomic policies, trade and exchange rate policies, and financial market policies 
etc.  The  question  is:  do  these  economic  policies  matter  after  controlling  for  IQI  and 
geography? 
  We introduce five different measures of economic policy variables, which have been 
discussed and used widely in the macro and international finance literature as determinants of 
GDP per capita/growth rates. These economic policy measures are the following: inflation, 
number of years a country is open according to the Sachs and Warner (1995) trade-openness 
measure
42, exchange rate differential (official vs. black market premium),
43 credit market 
deregulations,
44 and IMF capital market liberalization measure. First, following Easterly and 
Levine  (2002), we consider these economic policy measures as exogenous, meaning they 
affect  directly  the  level  of  economic  development  as  we  ignore  any  reverse  causality 
steaming  from  higher  development  quality  to  better  economic  policies.  Secondly,  we 
consider  these  policies  as  endogenous,  and  we  use  instruments  to  control  for  reverse 
causality, and results are reported for Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) sample.
45  
  In the exogenous economic policy columns, we introduce the variables one by one in 
the model specification with IQI and malaria risk (geography) as two control variables. In 
                                                 
42This is a dummy variable (1 open and 0 closed) which classified an economy as closed if it is closed according 
to any one of the following five criteria during the decade of the 1970s or 1980s: (i) its average tariff rate 
exceeded 40%, (ii) its non-tariff barriers covered more than 40% of imports, (iii) it had a socialist economic 
system (iv) it had a state monopoly of major exports, or (v) its black-market premium exceeded 20%.  
43A measure of exchange rate policy, which exits to ration foreign currency in the domestic economy. Hence, 
under, certain domestic economic condition, this may undermine resource-allocation and hamper economy. The 
data is from Freedom House, in a 0-10 scale, with 10 to countries without a black-market exchange rate; i.e., 
those with a domestic currency that is fully convertible without restrictions, and 0 rating is given when the black 
market premium is equal to, or greater than, 50%.  
44 The data is from Freedom House, which includes five factors: Ownership of banks, competition, extension of 
credit, avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative real interest rates, and Interest 
rate controls; in a 0-10 scale, with 10 to countries with least regulations.   




column 1, the inflation coefficient is negative and significant at the 10%-level.
46 This shows 
that inflation, considered exogenous, have some negative influence on development quality. 
In  this  case,  malfal  variable  is  not  significant  any  more,  but  has  the  right  sign.    In  the 
following specification, we added the number of years a country was open during 1960-1995, 
and it shows openness to international market had positively influenced the development 
quality. The remaining columns report three other economic policy measures-related to less 
market distortion as measured with the difference of black market to official exchange rate, 
credit market deregulations, and capital liberalization measures enter the specifications with 
positive signs but are insignificant. Finally, in all the specifications IQI remains significant at 
the  1%-level  and  the  size  of  the  coefficients  do  change  much  with  the  introduction  of 
different economic policy variables. We also find that in the second-stage, the malaria risk 
variable− enters with negative sign, but is insignificant. In the bottom of the table, we report 
the entire set of different diagnostics test as we discussed previously, and all of them pass the 
test. Now, we consider economic policy as endogenous in our model specifications. Once 
again, except for openness, none of the four variables is significant in the specifications. 
However, the capital liberalization measure is now showing a negative sign. As we found 
previously, IQI remains positive and significant in all these specifications.
47 (Appendix Table 
A14) 
  In sum, we find that in the exogenous policy case, the monetary policy of containing 
the inflation rate has a negative and significant coefficient, and so it is for the trade openness 
measure. Then, in the case of endogenous economic policy, only the trade openness variable 
remains positive and significant.
48 With the above sets of results, we observe that in cross-
country regressions by averaging the data figures over the past two decade period shows 
influence  of  policy  interventions,  but  significance  differs  across  specifications,  country 
groupings indicating stages of development, as well as effectiveness of different economic 
policy interventions. 
49  
                                                 
46 We excluded countries with more than 100% inflation rate from the sample.  
47 These results broadly hold for the whole sample. We used the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 
sample to follow the implications of the Easterly and Levine (2002) paper.  
48 The above results do not necessarily follow the finding of Easterly (2004), as he found not much importance 
of policies after controlling for institutions. 
49 See Basu and Das (2008) for further results of development and institutions in non-parametric analysis. The 




5.2 Panel data results  
    In  this  section,  we  estimate  the  panel  data  model  which  combines  cross-
section and time series data.  
  5.2b Panel data regressions with institutions and economic policy measure  
We report both the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates. (Appendix Table A15) In 
the first four columns, we added time-invariant geography variable as before in cross-section 
(latitude), along with IQI and EPOL (as measured by trade/GDP ratio for pooled OLS model. 
We  have  also  reported  three  dimensions  of  IQI  to  explain  the  variation  in  development 
quality. In all the different IQI specifications, we find that all the three dimensions of IQIs 
are positive and significant at the 1%-level. However, the size of the coefficients estimates on 
IQI’s is now much lower, as predicted by the theory. As described in the literature, we should 
not take these pooled OLS estimates seriously, however.  
In the next four columns, we estimated equation (3) with a fixed effects model. In the 
bottom  of  the  table,  the  Hausaman  specification  test  clearly  rejects  the  null  hypothesis, 
meaning that model should be fixed effects as against random effects specifications. The 
Breusch-Pagan  test  also  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  to  favour  the  OLS  model  is  random 
effects. OLS estimates are biased-upwards, so the fixed effects estimates on IQI coefficients 
and EPOL coefficients are much smaller, but they are all still significant.  
  The  panel  corrected  standard  errors  are  used  to  estimate  the  equation  (3).  (See 
Appendix Table A16) The results show clearly that the model estimated after adjusting the 
standard  errors  and  the  size  of  coefficients  have  been  reduced  as  compared  to  OLS 
estimations. All the coefficients enter with right sign, though, and they are highly significant. 
And then in the next four columns, we use FGLS estimation in the presence of panel specific 
AR  (1)  autocorrelation,  and  heteroskedasticity  across  panels  with  no  cross-sectional 
correlation. So, after considering the panel specific autocorrelation process, we find that the 





                                                 
50 We run the model specification in the sample for developing countries only, as they have made most of the 




  5.2c Panel data regressions with institutions and ‘other’ economic policy measures  
  We  use  panel  regression  by  introducing  other  economic  policy  measures  in  the 
specifications (Appendix Table A17). For this developing country sample, we report only 
fixed effects and FGLS-AR (1) specifications. In column 1, with the introduction of inflation 
rate  with  IQI,  and  the coefficient for  inflation is  negative and  significant.  The  Hausman 
specification test favours the fixed effects model (as the null is rejected at 12%-level). In the 
next three columns, we show results for three other economic policy measures, and all of 
them show positive sign and are significant. In column 5, we added all the economic policy 
measures with IQI. The size of coefficient on IQI remains almost unchanged with 5%-level 
of  significance,  and  inflation  and  IMF  capital  liberalization  measures  are  statistically 
significant. This indicates a negative impact of inflation on development quality, and so is a 
positive effect of the capital liberalization measure on development quality. These results 
follow as well in FGLS-AR (1) specifications, but now the size of coefficients has increased 
with the corresponding decline in standard errors.  
  5.2d Dynamic Panel data regressions: System-GMM  
  For the system-GMM, we use equation (6) with the proposed additional specifications 
as discussed above by BB. This procedure, however, can be implemented by either the one-
step estimator or the two-step with homoskedasticity of the standard errors. The two-step 
procedure faces a problem of over-fitting bias because the number of instruments is often too 
large with respect to the number of groups. Although, the one-step procedure does not have 
this  problem,  but  the  estimator  is  less  efficient.  We  report  the  two-step  estimator  with 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, which are based on the finite sample adjustment 
of as proposed by Windmeijer (2005).  
  Under the system-GMM procedure, we show results both for the whole sample and 
then  specifically  for  developing  countries.  (Appendix  Table  A18)  In  column  1,  we  once 
again  obtain  positive  significant  coefficient  on  IQI  as  in  all  other  previous  model 
specifications. The trade/GDP share (EPOL) is positive and significant, while coefficients of 
inflation  are  positive,  and  so  are  the  rest  of  the  economic  policy  variables,  but  other 
economic policy variables are insignificant. In the next specification, we include political IQI 




social  and  economic  IQI,  give  similar  results,  with  two  exceptions:  inflation  rate  is  still 
positive and significant, and so is the credit market deregulation variable.
51  
  In the next four columns, we present results for the developing countries sample as a 
robustness  check  in  the  system-GMM  case,  and  to  account  for  stages  of  development 
argument of the sample. In the basic specification to explain the variance in DQI, the results 
show that EPOL and other economic policy variables, apart from IQI being significant at 
1%-level, credit market deregulation variable is positive and significant at 10%-level and 
IMF capital liberalization measure is positive as well, but insignificant; and so is the EPOL 
variable. In the next column, we estimate the model with a political IQI variable, which 
shows the expected sign as before. The EPOL variable has ‘wrong sign’ now, as does the 
credit  market  deregulation  variable;  but  is  both  insignificant.  The  inflation  variable  is 
negative and significant. In social IQI specification, apart from inflation being negative and 
significant, the credit market deregulation coefficient enters the model with negative and 
significant  sign.  Finally,  with  the  economic  IQI  variable,  none  of  the  economic  policy 
variables enters the equation with significant sign, and EPOL has ‘wrong sign’.  
  By looking at the Sargen-Hansen J statistic test for over-identifying restrictions for 
two sets of sample, the results reported at the bottom of the table, suggest not to reject the 
null hypothesis, that implies that instruments used both in difference and level equations are 
valid for the endogenous model. Similarly, a first-order correlation AR (1) test rejects the 
null hypothesis and second-order AR (2) tests fail to reject null hypothesis in all the cases, 
meaning  no  higher  order  auto-correlation  exists  in  the  model,  which  clearly  support  the 
validity of the model specifications.  
   To sum up all the results from OLS to system-GMM, the institutional quality index 
(IQI)  is  robust  across  models  in  sign  and  significance  level  in  explaining  the  level  of 
development  quality  index  (DQI).  I  find  results  to  support  the  importance  of  economic 
policies and geography (and disease burden) to have ‘right signs’ and are significant, as key 
determinants  of  DQI,  with  some  degree  of  variation  in  their  significance  across  country 
groupings, indicating the relevance of accounting for stages of development in the analysis.  
                                                 
51 The inclusion of lagged value of DQI as one of the explanatory variables captures persistence in DQI. The 
highly positive and significant coefficient indicates that the level of DQI has persisted since the 1980s in the 




6. Conclusions  
  In recent years, following North’s idea of institutions matter, various authors have 
concluded differently to explain the differential level of economic performance by cross-
section analysis. Given this background, this paper provides evidence that in this increasingly 
globalized world, economic policy matters as do the geography and disease burden (and 
ecological conditions). The results of this paper seem to suggest strongly that both from the 
cross-section and panel-data analysis, the institutions, geography and economic policy play 
strong  roles  in  explaining  differential  levels  of  development,  although  their  relative 
significance in explaining DQI depends on the stages of development of a country.  
  So, the results in this paper indicate that institutions matter in the context of specific 
economic policy mixes, and geography related factors illustrated by disease burden, etc. The 
evidence  demonstrates  that  relative  influence  of  institutions  varies  across  stages  of 
development. Development quality is a complex phenomenon, and different factors are inter-
related and help build up the process to work efficiently. The institutions can not be set up 
overnight,  so  that  interventions  to  account  for  institutional  development.  As  institution 
supporting economic activities grow stronger, the need for and role of policy interventions 
are  expected  to  diminish.  The  institution  building  is  no  doubt  a  critical  factor  to  make 
markets act smoothly, but we ought to understand the national level characteristics and their 
domestic concerns. This makes a case for these countries to have significant policy space.
 52  
  A policy implication is that we can’t give generalized global solutions to address the 
local  problems.  We  can,  at  best,  provide  a  sense  of  an  overall  direction.  The  role  of 
institutions with development agenda and strategies should be rooted in specific conditions 




                                                 
52  Dixit  (2005)  described:  “In  reality,  each  case  of  development  failure  may  have  multiple  causes  acting 
simultaneously. ….The ultimate aim would be to find a complex cause, or a syndrome…we are unlikely to get a 






Table  A1:  Development  Quality  Index  (DQI)  and  Institutional  Quality  Index  (IQI): 
Definition and Sources of Indicators 
 Economic DQI  Economic IQI 
GDP per capita (PPP, $ international 2000)  Legal and property rights
3  
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)  Law and Order
1a 
Television sets (per 1,000 people)  Bureaucratic Quality
1a 
Radios (per 1,000 people)  Corruption
1a 
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita)  Democratic Accountability
1a 
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)  Government Stability
1a 




Health DQI  Social IQI 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  Press Freedom
3 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)  Civil Liberties
3 
Physicians (per 1,000 people)  Physical Integrity Index
4 
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)  Empowerment Right Index
4 
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)  Freedom of Association
4 
  Women's Political Rights
4 
  Women's Economic Right
4 
  Women's Social Right
4 
Knowledge DQI  Political IQI 




School enrolment, primary (% gross)  Political Rights
3 
School enrolment, secondary (% gross)  Index of Democracy
5 
Total number of years in schools
1  Polity Score
6 
  Lower Legislative
2 
  Upper Legislative
2 
  Independent Sub-federal Units
2 
   
   
Note. For DQI, data obtained from the World Development indicators CD-ROM 2006, World Bank;  
and  
1Barro and Lee 2000 dataset,  
1aPRS Group (2005) ICRG database; 
2 POLCON  Henisz Dataset; 
3Economic 
Freedom Index dataset, Freedom House; 
4CIRI Human Rights Data Project; 
5 PRIO Dataset;  








Table A2: List of all other variables in the analysis 
List of variables  
Trade to GDP ratio
10 (EPOL)  Adult European settler mortality rates in the early 19
th 
century(log of, annual deaths per 1000 population)
1(smajr) 
Fraction of English speaking population
2(engfrac)  Proportion of population at risk of falciparum malaria 
transmission in 1994
6(malfal) 
Fraction of other European language speaking 
population
2(eurfrac) 
1987 mean annual temperature in degree 
celsius
6(meantemp) 
Distance in absolute value of latitude
2 (geog)  Share of population in temperate ecozones
6(kgtemp) 
Linguistic fractionalization index
3(language)  Malaria ecology combines temperature, mosquito 
abundance, and vector specificity
6(me) 
Ethnic fractionalization index measures of ethnic 
heterogeneity
3(ethnic) 




3(religion)  Sachs and Warner openness measure (Updated)
 7(sw) 
  Constructed openness measure
8(epolc) 
Dummy variable 1=population is predominantly 
protestant(protestant) 
Hydrocarbon production per capita
5(lenerg) 
Dummy variable 1=population is predominantly 
catholic(catholic) 
Dummy variable =1 if a war during 1960s to 
1980s
9(ewardum) 
Dummy variable 1=population is predominantly 
muslim(muslim) 
Period of national independence. =0 if independence before 
1914,=1 if  independence between 1914 and 1945, =2 if 
independence between 1945 and 1989, and =3 if after 
1989
9(state) 





Average number of frost-days per month in 
winter
4(frstday) 
Exchange rate differential (Official vs BMP)
 12 (ome) 
Percentage of tropical land area
5(tropical)  Credit market regulation
12(cmr) 
Dummy variable 1=countries access to sea
5(access)  IMF capital control measure
11(imfc) 
Proportion of population live with risk of malaria 
transmission in 1994
6(mal94p) 
Sachs-Warner # years country open in 1960-95
7(yearsopen) 
 Note: Code of variables are in parentheses. 
1Acemoglou et al (2001),  
2 Hall and Jones (1999),  
3 Alesina et al 
(2003), 
 4 Masters and McMillan (2001), 
 5 Gallup and Sachs (1998), 
 6 Sachs (2001), 
7 Sachs and Warner (1995), 
and Wacziarg and Welch (2003), 
8 Frankel and Romer (1999), 
 9 Mcarthur and Sachs (2001), 
10 World Bank, 
11 
IMF and World Bank , 
















Table A3: List of countries in sample 
Country Code  OECD (22)  Country Code  Latin America (22) 
AUS  Australia  BOL  Bolivia© 
JPN  Japan  COL  Colombia 
NZL  New Zealand  CRI  Costa Rica 
GRC  Greece  DOM  Dominican Republic© 
PRT  Portugal  ECU  Ecuador 
CAN  Canada  GTM  Guatemala© 
USA  United States  GUY  Guyana 
AUT  Austria  JAM  Jamaica© 
BEL  Belgium  PER  Peru 
CHE  Switzerland  PRY  Paraguay© 
DNK  Denmark  SLV  El Salvador© 
ESP  Spain  HND  Honduras© 
FIN  Finland  HTI  Haiti∆ 
FRA  France  NIC  Nicaragua© 
GBR  United Kingdom  ARG  Argentina 
IRL  Ireland  BRA  Brazil 
ISL  Iceland  CHL  Chile 
ITA  Italy  MEX  Mexico 
LUX  Luxembourg  PAN  Panama 
NLD  Netherlands  TTO  Trinidad and Tobago© 
NOR  Norway  URY  Uruguay 
SWE  Sweden  VEN  Venezuela 
       
Country Code  Sub-Sahara Africa (26)   Country Code  Asia and Pacific (13) 
AGO  Angola∆  BGD  Bangladesh∆ 
BWA  Botswana  CHN  China 
CIV  Cote d'Ivoire  IDN  Indonesia 
CMR  Cameroon  IND  India 
ETH  Ethiopia∆  KOR  Korea, Rep. 
GAB  Gabon  LKA  Sri Lanka 
GHA  Ghana  MYS  Malaysia 
GIN  Guinea∆  PAK  Pakistan 
GNB  Guinea-Bissau∆  SGP  Philippines 
KEN  Kenya  SGP  Singapore 
LBR  Liberia∆  THA  Thailand 
MDG  Madagascar∆  VNM  Vietnam 
MLI  Mali∆  PNG  Papua New Guinea© 
MOZ  Mozambique∆     
MWI  Malawi∆  Country Code  Middle East and North Africa (13) 
NER  Niger∆  ARE  United Arab Emirates 
NGA  Nigeria  ISR  Israel 
SDN  Sudan∆  KWT  Kuwait 
SEN  Senegal∆  IRN  Iran, Islamic Rep. 
TGO  Togo∆  JOR  Jordan 
TZA  Tanzania∆  SYR  Syrian Arab Republic 
UGA  Uganda∆  BHR  Bahrain 
ZAF  South Africa  OMN  Oman 
ZAR  Congo, Dem. Rep. ∆  SAU  Saudi Arabia 
ZMB  Zambia∆  DZA  Algeria 
ZWE  Zimbabwe  EGY  Egypt, Arab Rep. 
    MAR  Morocco 
Country Code  EU and Other Europe (6)  TUN  Tunisia 
ALB  Albania     
BGR  Bulgaria     
ROM  Romania     
HUN  Hungary     
POL  Poland     
TUR  Turkey     
Source: United Nations and World Bank 
 ∆ are LDCs and  
© are SMEs in the sample of countries  
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Table A4: Correlation of institution dimensions with development dimensions 
  Development Quality Index dimensions 
 
Log of GDP per 
capita(constant 
2000 US$)  
Economic DQ  Health DQ  Education DQ   Development 
Quality Index 
   (1980-2004)  (1980-2004)  (1980-2004)  (1980-2004)  (1980-2004) 
Institutional Quality Index (1980-2004)  0.79  0.79  0.77  0.74  0.79 
Political IQ (1980-2004)  0.68  0.66  0.63  0.68  0.65 
Social IQ (1980-2004)  0.69  0.74  0.71  0.66  0.73 
Economic IQ (1980-2004)  0.85  0.83  0.84  0.74  0.86 
                Notes: All coefficients are significant at 1 percent. 
 
Table A5: Correlation of Development Quality Index (DQI) with all other variables in the analysis 
Code  DQI 1980-2004    Code  DQI 1980-2004    Code  DQI 1980-2004 
smajr  -0.69***    frstarea  0.70***    sw  0.42*** 
engfrac  0.25***    frstday  0.74***    epolc  0.43*** 
eurfrac  0.22**    tropical  -0.577***    yearsopen  0.69*** 
geog  0.74***    access  -0.13    lninf  -0.41*** 
language  -0.41***    mal94p  -0.65***    ome  0.34*** 
ethnic  -0.60***    malfal  -0.60***    cmr  0.46*** 
religion  -0.03    malfal94  -0.58***    imfc  0.26*** 
protestant  0.45***    meantemp  -0.75***       
catholoc  0.031    kgptemp  0.74***       
muslim  -0.33***    me  -0.49***       
      lt100km  0.32***       
      lenerg  0.22**       
      elwardum  -0.425***       
      state  -0.42***       
 Notes: Sample size varies with the choice of indicator. ***Significant at 1 percent, **Significant at 5 percent, * Significant at 10 percent,  




          Table A6: OLS Regressions: Determinants of DQI 
  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index (DQI) 
 Panel 1  1980-1984  1985-1989  1990-1994  1995-1999  2000-2004  1980-2004 
IQI  1.29***  1.89***  2.46***  2.16***  2.38***  2.25*** 
  (0.13)  (0.23)  (0.31)  (0.34)  (0.33)  (0.27) 
Geography  3.51***  4.87***  4.53***  5.16***  5.59***  4.29*** 
  (0.45)  (0.71)  (1.06))  (1.06)  (1.29)  (0.85) 
Economic policy  0.24*  0.52*  0.59*  0.65*  0.71*  0.64* 
  (0.15)  (0.30)  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.59)  (0.35) 
R-squared  0.82  0.79  0.76  0.70  0.66  0.78 
F-statistics  151.81  164.8  146.06  102.11  107.1  160.54 
 Panel 2  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index (DQI) 
Political IQI  1.29***  1.77***  2.17***  1.43***  1.84***  2.16*** 
  (0.15)  (0.23)  (0.32)  (0.31)  (0.38)  (0.30) 
Geography  4.48***  6.32***  7.01***  7.36***  7.89***  6.05*** 
  (0.44)  (0.66)  (0.99)  (0.97)  (1.20)  (0.82) 
Economic policy  0.39***  0.82***  0.85**  0.87**  0.99*  0.96*** 
  (0.16)  (0.32)  (0.41)  (0.42)  (0.63)  (0.39) 
R-squared  0.79  0.74  0.68  0.62  0.59  0.73 
F-statistics  117.86  122.63  109.03  73.64  78.91  114.17 
Panel 3  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index (DQI) 
Social IQI  1.84***  2.52***  2.77***  1.99***  2.75***  2.62*** 
  (0.23)  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.32)  (0.37)  (0.34) 
Geography  4.11***  5.54***  5.76***  6.39***  6.11***  5.29*** 
  (0.41)  (0.67)  (0.93)  (0.85)  (1.17)  (0.75) 
Economic policy  0.27  0.53  0.49  0.58  0.59  0.59 
  (0.18)  (0.36)  (0.41)  (0.43)  (0.62)  (0.43) 
R-squared  0.78  0.74  0.71  0.66  0.64  0.73 
F-statistics  153.22  171.63  166.69  121.97  124.36  185.62 
Panel 4  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index (DQI) 
Economic IQI  1.92***  2.95***  4.28***  4.36***  5.77***  4.10*** 
  (0.23)  (0.43)  (0.56)  (0.64)  (0.88)  (0.50) 
Geography  3.08***  4.44***  3.50***  3.51***  2.78*  2.97*** 
  (0.51)  (0.80)  (1.13)  (1.16)  (1.65)  (0.94) 
Economic policy  0.15  0.28  0.36  0.31  0.25  0.32 
  (0.13)  (0.28)  (0.30)  (0.29)  (0.45)  (0.28) 
R-squared  0.81  0.79  0.79  0.76  0.74  0.82 
F-statistics  142.14  166.31  146.77  108.92  122.63  171.1 
Observations  102  102  102  102  102  102 
# Countries  102  102  102  102  102  102 
 Notes: Constants are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses 
t-statistics, ***Significant at 1 percent, **Significant at 5 percent, * Significant at 10 percent 
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Table A7: 2SLS-IV Regression estimates of DQI with Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) Instruments for IQI 
Panel A: Second-stage regressions  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index  
  Ex-colony sample 
  All  Excluding neo-Europes  Excluding Africa 
Excluding neo-Europe 
and Africa 
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  3.57***    3.54***    3.20***    3.27***   
   (0.58)    (0.85)    (0.84)    (1.33)   
Economic policy (EPOL)  1.30    1.42*    2.34***     2.24**   
   (0.86)     (0.85)     (0.88)     (0.97)   
Geography(GEOG)  0.06    10.94    23.28*     29.88**   
   (7.92)    (9.64)    (11.36)     (11.36)   
Observations  59    60    40     36   
R-squared  0.47    0.31    0.46     0.32   
 Instruments  Settler Mortality and constructed trade share 
Heteroskedasticity test: (p-value)    0.01  0.08    0.81    0.41   
Over-identification test: (p-value)  Exactly identified equations 
Endogeneity test: (p-value)    0.01  0.00    0.01    0.00   
Panel B: First-stage regressions                  
  Dependent variables 
   IQI  EPOL  IQI  EPOL  IQI  EPOL  IQI  EPOL 











Geography  4.09*  -3.70  1.42  -5.74***  1.38  -6.69**  -0.27  -9.65*** 
   (2.16)  (2.65)  (1.87)  (2.45)  (2.20)  (3.11)  (2.20)  (3.31) 
Settler mortality(log )  -1.04***  -0.04  -0.78***  0.04 
-
1.42***  -0.50  -1.06***  -0.43 
   (0.24)  (0.29)  (0.21)  (0.28)  (0.33)  (0.47)  (0.34)  (0.51) 
Constructed trade share(EPOLC)  -0.34  1.85***  0.30  2.06***  -0.74*  1.84***  -0.16*  2.02*** 
   (0.40)  (0.49)  (0.37)  (0.48)  (0.42)  (0.60)  (0.44)  (0.65) 
F-Test for excluded instruments  9.59  7.58  9.06  9.99  9.99  5.91  4.85  6.67 
R-squared  0.42  0.27  0.32  0.31  0.50  0.35  0.26  0.41 
Shea R-squared  0.27  0.22  0.20  0.22  0.36  0.25  0.20  0.25 
Note: Constants are not reported. T-statistics in the first-stage regressions, and Z-statistics in second stage regressions. Robust standard errors adjusted for 
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Table A8: 2SLS-IV Regression estimates of DQI with Hall and Jones  (1999) Instruments for IQI 
 Second-stage regressions  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index  
  Col.5  Col.6   Col.7  Col.8  
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  1.69***       
  (-0.37)       
Political Institutional Quality Index(IQI)    1.84***     
    (0.44)     
Social Institutional Quality Index(IQI)      2.38***   
      (0.61)   
Economic Institutional Quality Index(IQI)        3.87*** 
        (0.68) 
Economic policy (EPOL)  1.27***  1.50***  1.25**  0.85** 
  (-0.54)  (0.59)  (0.61)  (0.38) 
Geography(GEOG)  5.53***  32.80***  28.74***  17.01*** 
   (-1.03)  (4.76)  (5.32)  (5.89) 
Observations  99  99  99  99 
R-squared  0.76  0.72  0.71  0.82 
Instruments  engfrac, eurfrac, epolc 
Heteroskedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg 




0.00  0.010 
Over-identification test: Hansen-Sargan J statistic 









Endogeneity test: Durbin-Wu-Hausman: 
2 c (p-value)  0.024  0.17  0.14  0.19 
F-Test for excluded instruments: IQI dimensions  19.41  22.12  17.45  8.59 
                                                    OPEN 1980-2004  18.50  18.50  18.50  18.50 
Shea R-squared:  IQI dimensions  0.38  0.41  0.36  0.19 
                             OPEN 1980-2004  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.34 
Note: Constants are not reported. Z-statistics. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses ***Significant at 1 percent,  
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Table A9: Robustness checks 2SLS-IV Regression estimates: Region, Legal origin, Religion, Language and Ethnic fractionalization  
Second-stage regressions  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index  
   Col.1   Col.2  Col.3   Col.4   Col.5  Col.6   Col.7  Col.8  Col.9  Col.10 
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  4.55***  3.49***  3.61***  4.21**  3.58***  2.16***  1.89***  1.81***  1.85***  1.80*** 
  (1.59)  (0.84)  (0.64)  (0.87)  (0.63)  (0.32)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.31)  (0.28) 
Economic policy (EPOL)  1.32  1.36  1.27  1.71**  1.32  0.43*  0.65***  0.72***  0.75***  0.71*** 
  (0.92)  (0.85)  (0.83)  (0.81)  (0.90)  (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.25) 
Geography(GEOG)  8.95  10.91  -0.70  2.59  0.32  17.08***  25.82***  28.20***  27.12***  25.93*** 
   (13.22)  (9.44)  (8.14)  (9.05)  (8.31)  (6.71)  (3.69)  (4.15)  (3.85)  (4.03) 
Asia Dummy  2.19          -2.04         
  (3.43)          (2.08)         
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy  3.11          -3.43*         
  (5.51)          (1.89)         
Latin America Dummy  -3.85          -4.12**         
  (4.11)          (1.84)         
French legal origin    -0.82          -1.28       
    (1.81)          (0.90)       
Religion fractionalization      -1.04          2.89     
      (3.09)          (1.95)     
Language fractionalization        7.81*          0.22   
        (4.39)          (1.56)   
Ethnic fractionalization          0.31          -1.81 
          (3.83)          (2.03) 
p-values for regional dummy  0.30          0.11         
Instruments  Settler mortality, epolc  engfrac, eurfrac, epolc 
Outlier countries  Neo-Europe (Australia, Canada, New Zealand,  and USA)  Japan and Singapore 
Observations  60  60  60  60  59  97  97  97  95  97 
R-squared  0.70  0.76  0.79  0.74  0.79  0.87  0.87  0.86  0.86  0.86 
Constants are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses. Z-statistics. ***Significant at 1 percent, **Significant at 5 
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        Table A10: Robustness checks 2SLS-IV Regression estimates: Additional geography measures  
Second-stage regressions  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index  
   Col.1   Col.2  Col.3   Col.4   Col.5  Col.6   Col.7  Col.8 
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  1.82***  1.85***  1.95***  1.94***  1.76***  1.79***  1.84***  1.87*** 
  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.38)  (0.29) 
Economic policy (EPOL)  0.69***  0.74***  0.55*  0.81***  0.85***  0.76***  0.50  0.78 
  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.29)  (0.33)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.48)  (0.29) *** 
Geography(GEOG)  27.21***  26.37***  24.87***  14.74***  21.46***  24.77***  26.08***  24.89*** 
   (3.85)  (6.25)  (6.60)  (4.86)  (4.52)  (5.25)  (4.80)  (4.37) 
Landlocked  -0.96               
  (1.19)               
% of tropical land area    -0.30             
    (1.75)             
% Area under frost in winter      1.63           
      (2.43)           
Days under frost in winter        0.32***         
        (0.10)         
Meantemp in 1987          -0.18       
          (0.15)       
% population in temperate ecozones             1.47     
            (2.42)     
% land area within 100km of sea              1.50   
              (2.36)   
Hydrocarbon production per capita                0.37** 
                       (0.17) 
Instruments  engfrac, eurfrac, epolc 
Outlier countries  Japan and Singapore 
Observations  97  97  76  76  97  97  94  92 
R-squared  0.86  0.86  0.89  0.90  0.86  0.86  0.86  0.86 
Note: Constants are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses. Z-statistics. ***Significant at 1 percent,  
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        Table A11: 2SLS-IV Regression estimates: DQI, Settler mortality, geography-Malaria burden 
Second-stage regressions  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index  
   Col.1  Col.2  Col.3  Col.4  Col.5  Col.6  Col.7  Col.8 
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  2.57***        2.94***       
  (0.66)        (0.38)       
Political IQI     2.86        4.31***     
    (1.86)        (0.94)     
Social IQI       1.25        3.08***   
      (1.29)        (0.91)   
Economic IQI         3.68***        4.10*** 
        (0.68)        (0.46) 
Economic policy (EPOL)  0.70  1.19**  0.69  0.43  0.68  1.38*  0.46  0.37 
  (0.65)  (0.68)  (0.73)  (0.46)  (0.66)  (0.80)  (0.81)  (0.46) 
% of population live with risk of malaria transmission risk in 1994  -3.85  -5.33  -14.29***  -5.49**         
  (4.14)  (8.79)  (4.57)  (2.68)         
% of population at risk of falciparum malaria transmission in 1994          -1.49  1.81  -6.64**  -3.89*** 
          (2.25)  (4.12)  (3.05)  (1.63) 
Observations  57  57  57  57  57  57  57  57 
R-squared  0.71  2.86  0.48  0.77  0.71  0.48  0.60  0.78 
Instruments            smajr, epolc, meantemp lt100km geog lenerg state elwardum (for all Cols.) 
Heteroskedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg 
2 c (p-value)  0.00  0.00  0.51  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Over-identification test: Hansen-Sargan J statistic 
2 c (p-value)  0.10  0.06  0.10  0.79  0.07  0.05  0.10  0.82 
Endogeneity test: Durbin-Wu-Hausman: 
2 c (p-value)  0.12  0.01  0.02  0.10  0.05  0.00  0.12  0.07 
F-Test for excluded instruments:  
                                                    IQI dimensions  13.85  8.82  12.15  14.80  13.85  8.82  12.15  14.80 
                                                    EPOL 1980-2004  6.19  6.19  6.19  6.19  6.19  6.19  6.19  6.19 
                                                     MAL94P/ MALFAL  9.03  9.03  9.03  9.03  15.30  15.30  15.30  15.30 
Shea R-squared:                         IQI dimensions  0.17  0.07  0.23  0.30  0.42  0.27  0.41  0.50 
                                                     EPOL 1980-2004  0.50  0.41  0.47  0.49  0.51  0.49  0.49  0.50 
                                                     MAL94P/ MALFAL  0.15  0.07  0.21  0.26  0.44  0.33  0.45  0.51 
Note: Ex-colonies are included in the sample only. Constants are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses. Z-statistics. 
***Significant at 1 percent, **Significant at 5   percent, * Significant at 10 percent       
 
 
- 40 - 
        Table A12: 2SLS-IV Regression estimates: DQI, geography -Malaria burden 
Second-stage regressions  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index  
   Col.1   Col.2  Col.3   Col.4   Col.5   Col.6   Col.7   Col.8  
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  2.91***        3.40***       
  (0.71)        0.51       
Political IQI     3.00**        4.77***     
    (1.38)        1.16     
Social IQI       3.51***        4.52***   
      (1.03)        0.79   
Economic IQI         4.39***        4.89*** 
        (0.75)        0.54 
% of population live with risk of malaria transmission risk in 1994(mal94p)  -6.41  -11.31***  -10.20***  -6.95**         
  (4.45)  (6.20)  (4.08)  (3.15)         
% of population at risk of falciparum malaria transmission in 1994(malfal)          -3.05  -2.16  -5.46*  -5.06** 
          3.16  5.34  3.23  2.18 
Economic policy (EPOL)  0.83  1.26**  0.81  0.47  0.79  1.38***  0.74  0.39 
  (0.55)  (0.62)  (0.60)  (0.39)  0.58  0.75  0.68  0.39 
Observations  91  91  91  91  91  91  91  91 
R-squared  0.74  0.59  0.70  0.79  0.73  0.50  0.68  0.80 
Instruments  epolc,  meantemp lt100km geog lenerg state elwardum (for all Cols.) 
Heteroskedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg 
2 c (p-value)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05 
Over-identification test: Hansen-Sargan J statistic 
2 c (p-value)  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.18  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.19 
Endogeneity test: Durbin-Wu-Hausman: 
2 c (p-value)  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
F-Test for excluded instruments:  
                                                     IQI dimensions  27.83  13.62  29.24  30.20  27.83  13.62  29.24  30.20 
                                                     EPOL 1980-2004  8.82  8.82  8.82  8.82  8.82  8.82  8.82  8.82 
                                                     MAL94P/ MALFAL  17.38  17.38  17.38  17.38  20.07  20.07  20.07  20.07 
Shea R-squared:                           IQI dimensions  0.19  0.12  0.21  0.26  0.38  0.23  0.36  0.45 
                                                     EPOL 1980-2004  0.40  0.41  0.40  0.38  0.40  0.42  0.41  0.39 
                                                     MAL94P/ MALFAL  0.17  0.13  0.17  0.22  0.35  0.27  0.32  0.41 
Note: Constants are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses. Z-statistics. ***Significant at 1 percent, **Significant at 5 
percent, * Significant at 10 percent.   
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          Table A13: Robustness checks: DQI in developing world, geography -Malaria burden 
Second-stage regressions  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index  
  Developing country   LDCs and SMEs  
   Col.1   Col.2  Col.3   Col.4   Col.5   Col.6   Col.7   Col.8   Col.9  Col.10 
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  0.93**        1.27***        0.70***  0.85* 
  (0.48)        (0.49)        (0.39)  (0.34) 
Political IQI     0.43        0.49         
    (0.67)        (0.72)         
Social IQI       0.69*        0.93**       
      (0.44)        (0.40)       
Economic IQI         1.69**        2.27***     
        (0.78)        (0.69)     
mal94p  -6.62***  -8.09***  -8.04***  -6.21***          -3.55***   
  (1.77)  (2.19)  (1.30)  (1.53)          (1.59)   
malfal          -5.25***  -7.17***  -7.01***  -5.22***    -2.59** 
              (1.50)  (2.16)  (1.09)  (1.21)     (0.90) 
Instruments  epolc, meantemp lt100km geog lenerg state elwardum (for all Cols.) 
Outlier countries  South Korea   
Observations  69  69  69  69  69  69  69  69  29  29 
R-squared  0.56  0.48  0.53  0.57  0.56  0.59  0.57  0.57  0.67  0.71 
Note: Constants are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses. Z-statistics. ***Significant at 1 percent, **Significant at 5 
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 Table A14: 2SLS-IV Regression estimates: DQI with ‘other’ economic policy measures 
 Second-stage regressions   Dependent variable: Development Quality Index(DQI)  
  Exogenous economic policy  Endogenous economic policy 
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  2.86***  2.43***  2.75***  2.85***  3.12***  2.34***  2.12***  1.84**  2.68***  2.62*** 
   (0.40)  (0.40)  (0.52)  (0.45)  (0.50)  (0.51)  (0.52)  (0.96)  (0.56)  (0.53) 
Inflation   -2.17*          -1.05          
   (1.27)          (1.87)          
Sachs-Warner- # of years open    9.26**          11.87*        
     (4.69)          (7.24)        
Exchange rate differential (Official vs. BMP)      0.47          1.42      
       (0.41)          (1.26)      
Credit market de-regulation        0.92          0.46    
         (0.80)          (1.15)    
Capital liberalization measures          0.35          -3.95 
           (1.98)          (11.64) 
malfal  -2.09  -0.26  -2.30  -0.56  -0.68  -4.43  -1.02  -5.66  -0.97  -3.17 
  (2.26)  (2.08)  (2.61)  (2.67)  (2.40)  (2.55)  (1.84)  (4.71)  (2.43)  (3.91) 
Observations  45  52  49  49  52  48  52  51  51  56 
R-squared  0.68  0.74  0.63  0.63  0.61  0.65  0.74  0.60  0.63  0.55 
Instruments 
 
smajr geog landlock meantemp lt100km lenerg state 
elwardum 
 
smajr geog ethnofrac landlock meantemp lt100km 
lenerg state elwardum 
Heteroskedasticity test: (p-value)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Over-identification test: (p-value)  0.36  0.62  0.31  0.30  0.27  0.30  0.66  0.51  0.19  0.21 
Endogeneity test: (p-value)  0.30  0.22  0.30  0.31  0.12  0.21  0.18  0.27  0.48  0.22 
F-Test for excluded instruments: (p-value)                               0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Note: Constants are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses. Z-statistics. ***Significant at 1 percent, **Significant at 5 
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                       Table A15: Panel data: DQI in developing world  
  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index  
   POOLED estimates-OLS  Fixed effects-within group  
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  0.96***        0.35***       
  (0.15)        (0.13)       
Political IQI     0.78***        0.35***     
    (0.15)        (0.10)     
Social IQI       1.09***        0.54   
      (0.24)        (0.17)   
Economic IQI         1.43***        0.22*** 
        (0.24)        (0.15) 
Economic policy (EPOL)  0.41***  0.51***  0.40***  0.34***  0.25***  0.24***  0.25***  0.30*** 
   (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
Geography(GEOG)  2.69***  2.94***  3.03***  2.25***         
  (0.49)  (0.55)  (0.51)  (0.52)         
# Observations  375  375  375  375  375  375  375  375 
# Countries  75  75  75  75  75  75  75  75 
R-squared  0.48  0.43  0.41  0.46  0.28  0.22  0.19  0.17 
F-test  34.88  31.05  29.36  27.31  14.90  15.35  14.77  13.28 
Hausman test[p-value]          0.08  0.01  0.00  0.02 
Breusch-Pagan test[p-value]  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00             
            Note: Notes: Constants are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses. t-statistics.  
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                        Table A16: : Panel data: DQI in developing world  
  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index  
   Panel corrected standard errors (PCSE)  Generalised least squares-Panel specific AR1 (GLS) 
Institutional Quality 
Index(IQI)  0.57***        0.18***       
  (0.09)        (0.05)       
Political IQI     0.38***        0.13***     
    (0.08)        (0.05)     
Social IQI       0.67***        0.42***   
      (0.10)        (0.08)   
Economic IQI         0.48***        0.05 
        (0.11)        (0.06) 
Economic policy (EPOL)  0.21***  0.25***  0.25***  0.27***  0.06**  0.09***  0.11***  0.17*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
# Observations  375  375  375  375  375  375  375  375 
# Countries  75  75  75  75  75  75  75  75 
R-squared  0.64  0.64  0.77  0.71         
Wald test  60.03  46.62  92.26  59.87  17.37  14.83  40.14  70.38 
Log likelihood          31.81  24.68  -18.30  -0.74 
          Note: Notes: Constants are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses. Z-statistics. ***Significant at  
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Table A17: Panel data: DQI in developing world with Economic policy measures 
  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index 
  Fixed effects-within group   Generalised least squares-Panel specific AR1(GLS) 
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  0.43***  0.37***  0. 37***  0.42***  0.35**  0.80***  0.52***  0.50***  0.59***  0.76*** 
  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05 ) 
Economic policy (EPOL)          0.31**          0.28*** 
          (0.14)          (0.04) 
Inflation  -0.12***        -0.10***  -0.18***        -0.10*** 
  (0.02)        (0.02)  (0.01)        (0.01) 
Exchange rate differential (Official vs. BMP)    0.02***      -0.00    0.01      -0.02*** 
    (0.00)      (0.00)    (0.00)      (0.00) 
Credit market de-regulation      0.04***    -0.00      0.01***    -0.00 
       (0.01)    (0.02)      (0.0)    (0.00) 
Capital liberalization measures        0.20*  0.19**        0.19***  0.28*** 
         (0.10)  (0.09)        (0.04)  (0.03) 
# Observations  316  333  329  375  294  316  333  329  375  294 
# Countries  72  67  67  75  67  72  67  67  75  67 
R-squared  0.25  0.20  0.20  0.29  0.28           
F-test  21.74  12.02  8.77  10.17  8.16           
Wald Statistics            3808.53  96.22  98.79  177.82  400.44 
Log likelihood            13.07  -1.17  7.89  13.52  -2.81 
Hausman test[p-value]  0.12  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00           
Breusch-Pagan test[p-value]  0  0  0  0  0           
   Note: Notes: Constants are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses. t-statistics for fixed effects, and Z-
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Table A18: SYSTEM GMM: Blundell and Bond (1998), two-step procedure, determinants of DQI 
  Dependent variable: Development Quality Index 
  Whole sample  Developing country sample 
Lag of DQI   0.71***  0.90***  0.86***  0.74***  0.86***  0.93***  0.91***  0.90*** 
  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Institutional Quality Index(IQI)  1.66***        0.47***       
  (0.32        (0.14)       
Political IQI    0.81**        0.23**     
    (0.34)        (0.11)     
Social IQI      1.08***        0.52***   
      (0.44)        (0.19)   
Economic IQI        2.21***        0.46** 
        (0.47)        (0.20) 
Economic policy (EPOL)  0.61**  0.74**  0.39  0. 32  0.01  -0.02  -0.06  -0.04 
  (0.30)  (0.31)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.03)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.08) 
Inflation  0.05  0.07  0.07  0. 16***  -0.08  -0.06*  -0.08**  -0.04 
  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Exchange rate differential (Official vs. BMP)  0.00  0.02  0.05  0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Credit market de-regulation  0.04  0.06  0.01  0.09*  0.04*  -0.03  -0.04**  -0.02 
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Capital liberalization measures  0.16  0.12  0.08  0.05  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.02 
  (0.24)  (0.18)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
# Observations  340  340  340  340  241  241  241  241 
# Countries  92  92  92  92  67  67  67  67 
m1=first order autocorrelation  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
m2=Second order autocorrelation  0.35  0.42  0.06  0.74  0.42  0.20  0.20  0.27 
Hansen J test [p-value]  0.17  0.23  0.10  0.24  0.30  0.28  0.25  0.16 
Note: Constants are not reported. Year dummies are included in all model specifications. t-statistics ***Significant at 1 percent, **Significant at 5 
percent, * Significant at   10 percent. The SYS-GMM results are two step estimates with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are based on the 
finite sample adjustment of Windmeijer (2005). m1 and m2 tests are p-values of the null of no first-order  and no-second order auto-correlation. 
Hansen J tests are p-values of the over-identifying restrictions for GMM estimators, appropriate set of instruments.   
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